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In  recent  months  discussion  and  debate  regarding  the 
supervisory architecture for cross-border ﬁnancial institu-
tions in Europe have become lively and intense. Fed by 
industry complaints regarding the cost burden associated 
with the current supervisory framework, in which banking 
supervision is organised along national lines and cross-
border banks must often report to multiple supervisors, 
these  debates  have  generated  many  proposals.  In  one 
such  proposal,  the  European  Financial  Services  Round 
Table  advocates  a  lead  supervisor  model,  whereby  the 
authorities supervising the parent institution would play a 
key role  –  assisted by a college of supervisors comprised 
of authorities from countries in which the institution has 
substantial  operations  (see  European  Financial  Services 
Round Table, 2005).
Supervision of ﬁnancial institutions and management of 
crises involving these institutions are intrinsically linked ; 
hence proposals relating to the supervisory architecture 
also have a bearing on the potential organisation of crisis 
management functions. For instance, the lead supervisor 
model would emphasize the key role of authorities in the 
home country, and could lead to difﬁculties in managing 
a crisis, at least as long as the question of cost sharing 
among the countries in which the faltering bank operates 
has  not  been  resolved.  Yet,  as  noted  by  the  European 
Commissioner McCreevy (2005), determining “who pays 
the bill if a part of a banking group becomes insolvent”, 
i.e. establishing the ﬁnancial responsibilities of national 
authorities, constitutes a major issue in crisis management 
for cross-border banks.
This article addresses issues related to crisis management 
for cross-border ﬁnancial institutions. The analysis of the 
difﬁculties  involved  in  cross-border  crisis  management 
proceeds by ﬁrst identifying obstacles to swift crisis resolu-
tion in a purely domestic context (Section 1). Part of the 
complexity of crisis resolution is attributable to the fact 
that banks combine retail and wholesale sources of fund-
ing, and they often also operate a mix of business lines. 
Once domestic crisis management has been analysed, the 
additional complexities arising in the cross-border context 
are identiﬁed (Section 2).
Although  the  number  of  large  cross-border  banks  in 
Europe is limited, the issues that a crisis of one of these 
institutions  would  raise  are  crucial,  particularly  as  the 
mere  threat  of  the  bankruptcy  of  a  single  large  cross-
border bank could generate signiﬁcant disruptions in the 
ﬁnancial  systems  of  several  countries.  Yet,  cross-border 
crisis  management  gives  rise  to  particular  challenges. 
For instance, as suggested above, nationally based crisis 
management responsibilities for cross-border institutions 
can lead to conﬂicts of interest between national authori-
ties in a crisis, and these conﬂicts are likely to be ampli-
ﬁed when public funds are at stake. In addition, deﬁning 
supervision and crisis management responsibilities along 
national lines may lead to situations where the authori-
ties’ approach to supervision and crisis resolution is not 
compatible  with  banks’  functional  and / or  business-line 
approaches  to  their  operations,  which  often  transcend 
national borders.152
After highlighting the difﬁculties associated with cross-
border crisis management, the article draws some implica-
tions for cross-border supervision and crisis management 
functions (Section 3). It also discusses some of the ongo-
ing initiatives aimed at tackling cross-border issues.
1.    Crisis management in a domestic 
context : why is it so complex ?
Understanding  the  rationales  underlying  the  regulation 
of ﬁnancial institutions helps to appreciate the complex-
ity associated with the management of a crisis of even 
a purely domestic bank. Two main rationales justify the 
regulation of ﬁnancial institutions :
–    First,  small  uninformed  depositors  have  neither  the 
capacity nor the incentives to monitor bank manage-
ment ; therefore, they need to be represented by an 
agent  who  will  ensure  effective  “debt  governance” 
of  the  institution  (the  representation  hypothesis  of 
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). This representation role 
is taken on by public authorities, who monitor banks in 
the name of retail depositors.
–    A  second  rationale  for  bank  regulation  derives  from 
the observation that bank failures may lead to poten-
tial externalities, which can be of two different types. 
First, banks perform functions that are critical to the 
ﬁnancial  system  and  the  economy,  such  as  provision 
of the means of payment and the ﬁnancing of small 
and  medium-size  ﬁrms.  Bank  failures  can  jeopardize 
the performance of these functions. In addition, certain 
individual banks may provide services such as clearing 
or settlement, custodian services for securities, or cor-
respondent  banking,  which  are  also  deemed  critical 
for the efﬁcient functioning of the ﬁnancial system. A 
second type of externality arises from the possibility of 
a  bank  failure  generating  contagion  effects,  created 
by interlinkages between ﬁnancial institutions, such as 
lending and borrowing through interbank markets.
Both the organization and the scope of responsibility of 
ﬁnancial authorities are inﬂuenced by these two ration-
ales.  Yet,  although  ﬁnancial  authorities’  responsibilities 
may be well delineated in normal times, it may be more 
complex  to  deﬁne  them  in  a  crisis.  This  section  deals 
with speciﬁc challenges arising in the management of a 
domestic banking crisis.
1.1  Complexity and size of the ﬁnancial institution
Crisis management is complicated by (1) the combination 
of retail and wholesale sources of bank funding, as well 
as by (2) the mix of differing business lines operated by 
many banks :
(1)    The  ﬁrst  rationale  for  banking  regulation,  i.e.  the 
protection  of  small  depositors,  obviously  relates  to 
the  retail  funding  of  banks.  If  banks  were  funded 
solely  through  wholesale  sources,  this  rationale  for 
bank  regulation  would  no  longer  exist.  Protection 
of  retail  depositors  through  deposit  insurance  may 
necessitate funds to compensate insured retail deposi-
tors in a crisis, up to pre-speciﬁed limits. However, if 
the  deposit  insurance  fund  is  privately  owned  and 
adequately funded, the use of public funds to indem-
nify the depositors will not be necessary. On the other 
hand, wholesale sources of funding, such as interbank 
lending, are combined with retail sources for banks.   
If  wholesale  sources  of  funding  react  more  swiftly 
than uninformed retail depositors to a crisis affecting 
the  bank,  the  latter  (and  consequently  the  deposit 
insurance fund) may end up bearing a disproportion-
ate share of the burden of the crisis. In addition, the 
presence  of  wholesale  sources  of  funds  gives  rise 
to the possibility of contagion across banks via the 
wholesale funding channel. This prospect of conta-
gion and the associated negative impact on the retail 
depositors of the affected banks may well result in 
the use of public funds to aid the initial failing bank,   
in order to prevent contagion from occurring.
(2)    An additional layer of complexity arises when a bank 
mixes differing business lines. This is the case in e.g. 
universal  banks.  In  these  banks,  a  problem  initially 
arising from potentially riskier activities, such as invest-
ment banking, may affect the entire institution   (1).
The  management  of  a  crisis  involving  a  large  ﬁnancial 
institution,  especially  if  the  banking  system  is  already 
concentrated can lead to a problem referred to as “too-
big-to-fail”. Here again, however, the nature of the bank’s 
operations plays a key role, especially as a “functional” 
approach (protection of critically important functions) may 
be preferable to a “size” approach (protection of institu-
tions that are “too-big-to-fail”). To the extent that a bank 
provides  some  critically  important  functions,  then  this 
bank may be judged to be “too-critical-to-fail”. As is dis-
cussed in Box 1, however, pre-speciﬁed, privately funded 
(1)    A more explicit form of contagion between investment banking activities and 
retail depositors has been explored in the literature relating to a form of moral 
hazard by which universal banks may implicitly require its retail depositors to 
invest in more risky activities (see e.g. Boyd et al., 1998).153
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mechanisms can be set up to ensure business continuity 
of critically important functions (see e.g. Hüpkes, 2004).
1.2  Public policy objectives and conﬂicting interests
Even at a domestic level, the objectives of public policy 
are  potentially  conﬂicting.  Three  kinds  of  conﬂicts  are 
identiﬁed : (1) objectives resulting from ﬁnancial stability 
policy may conﬂict with objectives of public policy in other 
areas ; (2) it may be necessary to trade off short term and 
long term objectives of ﬁnancial stability ; (3) the different 
ﬁnancial authorities involved in crisis management may 
pursue incompatible objectives. Some of these conﬂicts 
are illustrated below.
1.    Public authorities pursue several objectives simultane-
ously, relating to industrial policy, competition policy, 
investor  and  consumer  protection  and  ﬁnancial  sta-
bility.  Conﬂicts  between  the  different  objectives  can 
materialize in case of crisis. For instance :
    –    Competition  and  ﬁnancial  stability  policies  are 
sometimes presented as conﬂicting : in crisis times, 
some  measures  aiming  at  stabilizing  the  ﬁnancial 
system (such as mergers of distressed banks with 
healthy ones) may result in higher concentration or 
subsidies and may conﬂict with competition policy. 
In the European Union, some of these measures, 
even in a purely domestic context, may require prior 
approval from the European Commission.
    –   Investor  protection  and  ﬁnancial  stability  :  listed 
groups are often obliged by law to disclose any sen-
sitive information. However, the disclosure of sensi-
tive  information  regarding  emergency  measures 
taken in listed banks to safeguard ﬁnancial stability 
may be counterproductive if it triggers panic among 
investors and deposit holders.
2.    Even  if  authorities  focus  solely  on  ﬁnancial  stabil-
ity  objectives,  in  some  situations  crisis  management 
authorities will have to trade-off long term and short 
term objectives. In the US, for instance, the Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991 requires that authorities adopt least-
cost policies, but allows a deviation from the least-cost 
resolution principle for “essential” banks. The deﬁni-
tion  of  such  a  policy  may  generate  expectations  of 
future intervention for “essential” banks and conse-
quently may encourage future undesirable behaviour 
by banks that would like to become essential or that 
already assess themselves as “essential”. This problem 
is especially acute in concentrated banking systems.
3.    The  institutional  architecture,  at  the  national  level, 
often comprises several different agencies. Each agency 
is in charge of the management of a speciﬁc aspect of 
the crisis or intervenes at a different stage in the devel-
opment of a crisis, ranging from normal times to full 
blown crisis situations. Although operational arrange-
ments to handle supervisory and crisis management 
functions vary from country to country, a stylized pres-
entation of the agencies that could possibly intervene 
in a crisis and their likely roles is given below :
    –   Supervisory  authorities  :  The  agency  in  charge  of 
banking  supervision  probably  possesses  the  most 
complete and up-to-date information and is likely 
to  be  the  ﬁrst  to  detect  problems  in  individual 
institutions that might necessitate the intervention 
of the other agencies. The organization of super-
visory  authorities  differs  from  country  to  country. 
Supervisors may represent a division of the central 
bank or be constituted as an autonomous agency 
and may cover banks, securities and insurance ﬁrms 
or focus only on banking supervision.
    –   Central bank  : Circumstances may lead the central 
bank to act as lender of last resort (LLR). In addi-
tion, thanks to its involvement in wholesale liquidity 
markets and in payment systems, such as Target, the 
central bank is likely to possess information both 
on the liquidity position of the ailing bank, and on 
the  repercussions  of  disturbances  on  other  banks 
through payment and settlement systems and on 
wholesale markets in general.
    –   Deposit  Insurance  :  Deposit  insurance  schemes 
insure depositors against losses, subsequent to the 
default of their bank. The crisis management role 
of the agency managing the deposit insurance fund 
can range from the “passive” indemniﬁcation role 
of a pure insurance fund to active participation in 
crisis  resolution.  The  design  of  deposit  guarantee 
schemes  may  differ  according  to  several  essential 
elements, including the scope and pricing of cover-
age and the funding and ownership of the scheme 
(see e.g. Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2005).
    –   Ministry of Finance (or Treasury)  : Assistance from 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  may  be  requested  when 
public funds are needed. Although there is no assur-
ance that the Ministry of Finance will be willing to 
allocate  public  funds  towards  the  resolution  of  a 
banking crisis, as banking crises are often politically 
sensitive, with far reaching and costly implications 
for  the  economy,  it  is  likely  that  the  Ministry  of 
Finance will want to be involved in crisis resolution, 154
even in cases in which it is not called upon to allo-
cate public funds.
    –    Crisis manager, Temporary management, Liquidator 
or  Receiver :  A  crisis  or  temporary  management   
or a liquidator, responsible for the management or 
the  winding  up  of  the  bank,  may  be  appointed. 
The manager or the liquidator may have to trade 
off the interests of several classes of creditors. The 
role of the management and of the liquidator, as 
well as their rights and duties and their degree of 
independence, must therefore be clearly speciﬁed 
beforehand.  Their  goals  may  be  as  diverse  as  to 
maximize returns for domestic creditors, to preserve 
going-concern value, to safeguard ﬁnancial stability, 
to protect employment, to ensure business continu-
ity of critical infrastructures, etc.
The presence of several agencies illustrates the need to 
designate  ex  ante  a  crisis  coordinator,  who  would  be 
responsible for coordinating communication and actions 
in the management of a crisis and for the dissemination 
of  information.  Several  authorities  have  a  vested  inter-
est  in  being  appointed  co-ordinator.  For  instance,  the 
Ministry of Finance may be politically accountable for the 
allocation of public funds. On the other hand, supervisory 
authorities are likely to be the ﬁrst informed of a crisis 
and possess the most complete set of information on the 
banking group and on its ﬁnancial situation, while central 
banks play a key role in the provision of emergency lend-
ing assistance.
Even when a coordinator is appointed, tensions between 
agencies can arise if their roles and objectives or if the 
procedures for crisis management are not well deﬁned 
or are ill-conceived and conﬂicting, especially if agencies 
do not internalize the effects of their (in) actions on other 
agencies. For instance, in a crisis situation involving a large 
bank facing a liquidity shortage but with a suspicion of 
solvency troubles, the lender of last resort may favour a 
liquidation in order to reduce the risk of ﬁnancial losses, 
especially if macro-prudential concerns are limited. If the 
bank is liquidated, LLR funds are not put at risk, whereas 
funds from the deposit insurance will be mobilized. The 
deposit insurance fund, on the other hand, may favour 
continuation of the bank, in order to avoid its funds being 
tapped (this problem may be exacerbated by the structure 
of the fund. For instance, recall that some deposit insur-
ance  fund  are  privately  owned).  Therefore,  the  institu-
tional design must clearly specify who takes the ultimate 
decision when a crisis arises, and on what grounds the 
decision must be taken.
1.3  Additional layers of complexity
Two additional features of crisis situations can generate 
further complexity : the inherent uncertainty in a crisis ; 
and  the  race  against  the  clock.  A  crisis  situation  is  by 
nature  uncertain.  Although  most  crises  possess  some 
common  features,  each  crisis  situation  is  essentially 
unique and presents contingencies that could not have 
been anticipated or dealt with ex-ante. In addition, the 
effects  of  crisis  management  authorities’  decisions  are 
also uncertain, since in most cases, there is no real prec-
edent that would allow an assessment of the potential 
consequences. As a result, a certain degree of discretion 
must be left to the authorities. Crisis management is also 
a race against the clock. A bad situation can very quickly 
deteriorate, due to the high leverage of banks and the 
ability of depositors to withdraw their deposits. Decisions 
must be taken very rapidly to restore conﬁdence and to 
avoid wide-scale bank runs and disruptions in the ﬁnancial 
sector.
Box 1  –  Crisis resolution mechanisms
Potential policy responses to banking crises are multiple. As argued by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), the policy 
response to an imminent bank failure affects the incentives and behaviour of lenders, potential lenders, bank 
management and crisis management authorities. One may classify policies according to whether they represent 
private sector solutions, liquidity support measures, public intervention tools, or the winding-down of troubled 
institutions.  (1) Many factors, including the critical functions performed by the institution, expected costs, the 
legislative framework, political considerations, the cross-border character of the ailing bank will inﬂuence the 
chosen solution.
(1)  See e.g. Economic and Financial Committee (2000).
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Private sector solutions :
Two kinds of private sector solutions can be distinguished :
The ﬁrst relates to predetermined institutional mechanisms, such as for instance :
    Privately funded mechanisms ensuring the business continuity of critical functions : Institutions performing some 
functions that are critical to the stability of the ﬁnancial system may be induced to consider the establishment 
of a legally isolated entity that would be capable of taking over the critical functions if a crisis emerges. This 
entity could be, e.g. a dormant bank. For instance, in the US, the Working Group on NewBank Implementation 
(2005) is working on the conditions to implement a newly created company to clear and settle US government 
bonds and to facilitate tri-party repurchase agreements for the sudden and involuntary exit of one of the two 
US clearing banks. Important challenges may be associated with the protection of critical functions. Bankruptcy 
law may need to be modiﬁed and operational issues need to be carefully studied. Privately funded mechanisms 
present the advantage of reducing moral hazard, since they allow an institution to go bankrupt while ensuring 
the business continuity of the critical functions it operates.
    The Liquidity Consortium Bank Mechanism : Liquidity Consortium banks are private limited companies in which 
all major domestic banking associations, as well as the central bank, participate. The objective of a liquidity 
consortium bank is to provide liquidity assistance to solvent banks that would need it, in order to secure the 
payment of their transactions. To the best of our knowledge, a liquidity consortium bank exists only in Germany 
(Liquiditäts-Konsortialbank).
Predetermined  institutional  mechanisms  are  generally  tailor-made  instruments  designed  to  address  speciﬁc 
circumstances and are thus highly dependent upon the environment in which they are implemented.
The second kind of private sector solution relates to ad hoc measures, in which authorities may want to or may 
be asked to act as “powerful brokers”, such as e.g. :
    Capital injection by shareholders or external parties : Supervisory authorities will call for a capital injection when   
a bank is undercapitalized. When, despite this call, capital requirements can not be met, more drastic solutions 
may be contemplated.
    Mobilization of less liquid collateral and refunding by a bank in the markets : An illiquid bank can obtain liquidity 
through the mobilization of less liquid collateral and the refunding by a bank, or on the market. If, however, 
an illiquid bank fails to obtain liquidity through these channels, authorities may act as a powerful broker to 
initiate a solution in which liquidity is provided by a consortium of banks. This consortium would be an ex-
post  mechanism,  while  mechanisms  similar  to  the  Liquiditäts-Konsortialbank  mentioned  above  are  ex-ante 
mechanisms.
    Restructuring of debts : It may be more proﬁtable for creditors to accept a haircut on their debt, imposed by crisis 
management authorities or determined by collective renegotiation, than outright liquidation.
    Acquisition (of parts) of the institution : Merging the ailing bank with a sound bank allows continuation of 
business while potentially minimizing the use of public funds. However, this type of private sector solution is 
not always possible for large banks because of excessive concentration in the banking sector, or because of the 
absence of candidate acquirers for a complex or very large ailing bank.
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2.    The cross-border dimension : an 
additional layer of complexity
2.1  Assessing the cross-border character of banks
Each layer of complexity identiﬁed in Section 1 is likely 
to  become  more  difﬁcult  to  manage  in  a  cross-border 
setting. Before analysing the additional sources of com-
plexity in a cross-border context, we ﬁrst provide evidence 
regarding the cross-border nature of several of the largest 
banks in Europe.
The  number  of  important  cross-border  banking  groups 
in  Europe  is  limited,  probably  at  between  20  and   
40  institutions  (see  e.g.  Schoenmaker  and  Oosterloo, 
2005). However, since most of these banks are very large, 
a severe stress affecting one of these institutions could 
have  important  knock-on  effects  on  the  economies  of 
several countries. Table 1 presents a number of potential 
indicators  of  banks’  internationalization  for  some  large 
banks in selected countries. The data in this table come 
from publicly available sources, principally banks’ annual 
reports. Since all banks do not report the values of each 
variable, the table is incomplete.
Liquidity Support Measures :
Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) is the responsibility of the central bank, which can decide to provide ELA either 
to an individual institution, in the Bagehot (1873) view, or to the entire market.
In the Eurosystem, the provision of ELA is primarily a national responsibility. Consequently, costs and risks resulting 
from ELA are borne at the national level. Mechanisms ensuring adequate ﬂows of information between national 
authorities and the ECB have been set up to ensure that any potential liquidity impact can be managed in a way 
consistent with the monetary policy stance and to ensure that any cross-border implications can be dealt with by 
the competent authorities.
Public Intervention :
In  exceptional  circumstances,  governments  can  intervene  to  support  an  ailing  bank,  to  recapitalize  it  or  to 
nationalize  it  to  eventually  resell  it,  after  restructuring,  in  part  or  as  a  whole  at  an  acceptable  price.  These 
operations  may  require  some  kinds  of  government  guarantees,  loans  or  transfers,  potentially  accompanied 
by changes in management. In more complex situations, new structures, such as a bridge bank or an asset 
management company (a hospital bank) may be set up :
    Bridge Bank : Hoggarth et al. (2004) describe the mechanism of the bridge bank. The ailing bank is closed by 
the chartering authority and is liquidated. A bridge bank, controlled by the liquidator, is set up to permit the 
restructuring and sale to a private institution. The bridge bank represents a form of temporary state-ownership 
that allows to guarantee business continuity.
    Hospital Bank : The setting-up of a bridge bank can be combined with the setting-up of a separate state-owned 
hospital bank, to which all bad loans are transferred (see e.g. Mitchell, 2001 and Bonin and Wachtel, 2004)
In the E.U., any public intervention must comply with E.U. legislation on State aid and, in case of intervention of 
the central bank, with Article 101 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which prevents any form   
of monetary ﬁnancing of faltering banks.
Winding Down :
As suggested by the Economic and Financial Committee (2000), in many cases, the liquidation of the ailing bank 
will be the preferred solution.157
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Large ﬁnancial groups in selected small EU member states
Belgium
Dexia Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.7 47.3 441.9 150
Fortis Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.4 40.8 (1) 55.4 (2) 58.7 36.5 535.5 181 106
KBC Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.9 52.9 37.8 (3) 48.2 284.9 96 36
Netherlands
ABN Amro Holding NV . . . . . 28.2 45.8 36.2 (4) 58.8 667.6 141 51
ING Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.6 42.5 (5) 33.6 33.2 (4) 46.2 684.0 144 48
Rabobank Group . . . . . . . . . . 87.5 80.0 509.4 107
Sweden
Nordea Bank AB . . . . . . . . . . . 26.1 29.7 331.1 131
Large ﬁnancial groups in selected large EU member states
France
BNP Paribas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.7 55.1 40.9 989.0 58 24
Groupe Crédit Agricole SA . . 70.0 67.7 50.8 1,105.4 64
Société Générale Group . . . . 50.0 54.5 60.0 681.2 40
Germany
Commerzbank Group . . . . . . 77.4 92.4 71.4 481.9 22
Deutsche Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.4 39.8 24.5 57.0 1,014.8 47 11
Dresdner Bank Group . . . . . . 78.5 83.1 89.7 40.7 602.5 28 25
HypoVereinsbank AG . . . . . . . 87.9 605.5 28
United Kingdom
Barclays Group . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.5 74.8 71.6 (8) 74.7 791.3 46 34
HBOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650.7 38
HSBC Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.1 23.5 (9) < 42.6 1,034.2 60 26
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 73.9 69.4 (4) 72.8 806.2 47 32
Large ﬁnancial groups in selected non EU member states
Switzerland
Credit Suisse Group . . . . . . . . 38.3 (6) 46.2 19.8 (4) 66.5 777.8 337 67
UBS AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.5 36.4 (7) 10.9 1,120.5 486 53
USA
Bank of America Corp . . . . . . 94.6 82.9 94.3 736.4 7 7
Citigroup Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.3 47.0 (10) 33.6 between
62 and 67
57.9 1,264.0 12 8
JP Morgan Chase & Co . . . . . 52.3 75.0 (11) 76.9 (4) 90.7 770.9 7 6
Sources: The Banker, OECD, Financial Groups’ annual reports.
(1) Total revenues net of interest expenses.
(2) Amount owed to customers.
(3) Banking.
(4) Interest earnings assets only.
(5) Operating proﬁt before tax.
(6) Net interest income.
(7) Total operating income.
(8) Customer accounts including trading business.
(9) Proﬁt on ordinary activities before tax excluding goodwill amortization.
(10) Including Canada.
(11) Including interbank.158
The variables in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns of the table propose 
a set of alternative measures of internationalization. These 
variables capture different dimensions of the cross-border 
character of banks, such as the internationalization of the 
workforce, of revenues, and of assets and liabilities. Taken 
individually, no single indicator provides a perfect measure 
of  the  degree  of  internationalization  of  the  institution. 
Taken together, however, the group of variables gives a 
better idea of the degree of internationalization of each 
bank,  as  it  reﬂects  differing  dimensions  of  internation-
alization. Additional variables, such as the organisational 
structure of the group (branch vs. subsidiaries), data relat-
ing to the countries in which the group has signiﬁcant 
operations,  or  data  on  links  with  foreign  banks,  etc., 
would allow to gain a more accurate picture of some of 
the risks that could be associated with internationaliza-
tion,  especially  as  such  data  could  provide  insights  on 
banks exposures in individual countries and on the poten-
tial  channels  through  which  a  problem  in  one  country 
could affect a bank in another country.
Because  of  their  international  activities,  cross-border 
banks  are  usually  large.  The  three  last  columns  of  the 
table  allow  comparisons  of  the  sizes  of  large  banks   
relative to the sizes of their home countries. The GDP of 
the home country is compared to both the total assets 
and the domestic assets of each large institution. Not sur-
prisingly, total assets represent a larger percentage of GDP 
in small countries than in large countries. For instance, 
total assets of UBS AG represent 486 p.c. of Switzerland’s 
GDP while those of BNP Paribas represent 58 p.c. of the 
GDP  in  France  and  those  of  Citigroup  Inc.  12  p.c.  of   
US GDP. The picture is slightly different when we consider 
domestic assets only. Although domestic assets also rep-
resent a larger share of the GDP in small countries, the 
difference  between  large  and  small  countries  tends  to 
reduce. For instance, domestic assets of UBS AG repre-
sent 53 p.c. of its home country’s GDP vs 24 p.c. for BNP 
Paribas. The relative importance of cross-border banks for 
large and small countries is dealt with in sub-section 2.5.
2.2    Allocation of responsibilities in a cross-border 
context
The legal structure of a bank inﬂuences the supervisory 
and,  to  some  extent,  the  crisis  management  responsi-
bilities of the different national authorities. Cross-border 
banks can choose between two legal forms of organi-
sation :  subsidiaries  or  branches.  Foreign  subsidiaries 
are  legally  independent  entities  owned  by  their  parent 
company. Theoretically, limited liability establishes a legal 
ﬁrewall shielding the parent company from losses in its 
subsidiaries and vice-versa. Foreign branches, on the other 
hand, are operating entities which are an integral part of 
the parent company, in that they do not have a separate 
legal status.  The parent  company  is thus  liable for  the 
obligations of its foreign branches. In the case of a crisis, it 
may thus be easier to organize the disposal of a subsidiary 
than the sale of a branch.
In terms of supervisory responsibilities, home authorities 
have responsibility for the supervision of foreign branches 
(with the important exception of the supervision of liquid-
ity which is the responsibility of host authorities  (1)), and 
host authorities have responsibility for the supervision of 
the  subsidiaries  they  host.  Although  cross-border  crisis 
management  responsibilities  are  not  clearly  deﬁned, 
current  perceptions  of  these  responsibilities  tend  to 
follow from the supervisory responsibilities. For instance, 
the  host  country  is  considered  to  be  responsible  for   
the liquidity assistance of both branches and subsidiaries 
it hosts. On the other hand, the home country is respon-
sible for deposit insurance coverage of depositors in for-
eign branches. A foreign branch may however purchase 
“top-off” deposit insurance coverage when the coverage 
offered  in  the  host  country  exceeds  that  in  the  home 
TABLE  2  TRADITIONAL VIEW OF HOST-COUNTRY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN-OWNED











(supervisory authorities) . . . . . . . . X
Liquidity support
(central bank) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Capital support
(political authorities /
Ministry of Finance) . . . . . . . . . . . X
Deposit guarantee
(deposit guarantee fund) . . . . . . . X X (1)
Winding down
(liquidator) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Source: Adapted from Borchgrevink and Moe (2004).
(1) In the EEA area, branches of credit institutions based in another EEA state
are entitled to purchase additional cover in the host country’s deposit guarantee
fund if the host country’s guarantee fund has a better coverage
than the home-country fund of which the branch is a member.
(1)  As put forward by the Basel Concordat, (Committee on Banking Regulations 
and Supervisory Practices, 1975), the rationale for entrusting host authorities 
with liquidity supervision is that “in managing their liquidity foreign banking 
establishments rely heavily on local practices and comply with local regulations, 
including those established for monetary purposes”. This includes of course the 
use of local currencies.159
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country. The host country is responsible for deposit insur-
ance coverage of foreign subsidiaries. Table 2 summarizes 
the traditional views regarding home-host responsibilities 
in case of crisis management.
2.3    Public policy objectives and conﬂicting interests 
in the cross-border context
The difﬁculty of deﬁning public policy objectives at the 
national level in domestic crises was discussed in Section 1.   
Not  surprisingly,  adding  the  international  dimension  to 
crisis management makes identiﬁcation of a single objec-
tive more difﬁcult, even in the case where the focus is 
exclusively on ﬁnancial stability and when a single author-
ity  is  in  charge  of  crisis  management  in  each  country. 
Indeed, as each national authority often has a mandate to 
minimize the negative externalities and the use of public 
funds at the national level, the objectives of the differing 
authorities may end up conﬂicting in some crisis situa-
tions, especially if handling externalities in one country 
would require public intervention in another country.
A  classic  example  in  which  the  objectives  of  national 
authorities  may  differ  is  that  of  a  bank  which  is  not 
systemically  important  in  the  home  country  but  which 
nevertheless has a systemically important branch in a host 
country  (1). Imagine that this bank fails. If no private sector 
solution emerges, the home authorities may be reluctant 
to  use  domestic  taxpayers’  money  to  bail  out  a  bank 
that is not of systemic importance. On the other hand, 
whereas  systemic  concerns  might  render  host  authori-
ties more favourably disposed to using public funds to 
resolve the crisis, they might not accept to allocate public 
funds to bail out the home country bank. As long as the 
sharing  of  the  costs  is  not  predetermined,  and  conse-
quently, as long as interests between national authorities 
diverge, authorities may end up acting non-cooperatively. 
However, as conﬂicts of interest are exacerbated by the 
use  of  public  funds,  prespeciﬁed  cross-border  mecha-
nisms that would rely on private funds (see Box 1) and 
that would ensure the business continuity of systemically 
important functions could help to alleviate these conﬂicts. 
Yet, implementing such mechanisms in a cross-border set-
ting would likely be more challenging than implementing 
them in a purely domestic context.
In addition to this classic example, there are other situa-
tions in which the interests of different national authori-
ties could diverge. Indeed, it is not even necessary for a 
bank in one country to have an establishment in a foreign 
country in order for its failure to trigger negative exter-
nalities in the foreign country. For example, the failure of 
a purely domestic bank performing critical functions for 
some foreign banks can generate negative externalities 
in foreign countries. Handling these negative externalities 
would likely necessitate intervention of the home authori-
ties of the bank. Yet, if the mandate of these authori-
ties is to ﬁnd the least-cost resolution mechanism while 
minimizing domestic negative externalities, the authorities 
may simply want to liquidate the bank.
An additional source of complexity is speciﬁc to the insti-
tutional architecture in the EMU. The primary objective 
of the Eurosystem is the maintenance of price stability. 
At the same time, the Eurosystem also aims to safeguard 
ﬁnancial stability and to contribute to the smooth conduct 
of policies pursued by the competent national authorities 
relating  to  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions. 
Yet, potential tension could arise between these objec-
tives.  They  are,  however,  not  addressed  in  the  present 
article (see e.g. Lamfalussy, 2004).
In brief, the purely national mandates of authorities can 
lead  to  conﬂicts  of  interest  between  national  authori-
ties. These conﬂicting interests introduce considerations 
of  non-cooperative  game  theory.  Box  2  presents  an 
short overview of the academic literature related to such 
conﬂicts.
(1)  This example, although frequently cited, is not likely to materialise as the number 
of systemic branches is limited. Indeed, systemic establishments are preferably 
incorporated as subsidiaries than as branches.
Box 2  –    Conﬂicts of interest in supervision and crisis management of  
cross-border banks : an overview of the literature
This box reviews the literature on potential conﬂicts of interest between supervisors or between crisis management 
authorities in a cross-border setting. Four main topics are identiﬁed : (1) Race (to the bottom or to the top) with 
regards to capital requirements ; (2) Withholding of information by authorities ; (3) Excessive forbearance in closure 
policy ; and (4) Inefﬁciency of improvised co-operation when public funds are needed.
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(1) Race (to the bottom or to the top) with regards to capital requirements
Because they have purely domestic mandates, nationally based, or “decentralised” supervisors may fail to internalise 
cross-border effects of their actions. If they fail to internalise the positive effects of their actions, nationally based 
supervisors will choose lower capital requirements than would a single, or a “centralised” supervisor of cross-
border banks. For example, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) study a situation in which capital requirements are 
binding ; therefore, an increase in the capital requirements in a given country reduces the loans granted by banks 
from that country. The reduction of loans by domestic banks reduces competition for foreign banks. The reduction 
in loans by domestic banks also raises the marginal return of the extra loans granted by competing foreign banks 
in that country, as foreign bank are able to charge a higher interest rate on the residual demand. This increases 
the average return to lending of foreign banks, increasing the return to monitoring. Indeed, banks choose the level 
of monitoring. The model assumes that monitoring costs are increasing and convex in the probability of success 
of loans. The optimal degree of monitoring by the bank in a given country decreases with the quantity of loans 
granted (due to decreasing marginal returns of loans), in both the home and the foreign countries in which the 
bank operates. Hence, if the capital adequacy ratio increases in a given country, loans in this country will fall, and 
the level of monitoring in foreign countries will rise. A “centralised”, or single, regulator would internalise this 
positive externality, whereas decentralised, nationally-based regulators will not. Decentralised supervisors, because 
they have an incentive to lower capital requirements to provide the banks they supervise with an advantage over 
foreign banks, may then engage in a “race to the bottom”.
On the other hand, if higher capital requirements in one country have negative effects in other countries, then 
decentralised  supervisors  will  fail  to  internalise  these  negative  externalities,  and  they  will  set  higher  capital 
requirements than would a centralised supervisor. Harr and Rønde (2003) analyse this type of case. In their model 
an increase in the capital requirements in the home country reduces the welfare of home banks’ shareholders, both 
those located in the home country and those located in foreign countries. The reduction in shareholder welfare is 
due to the fact that capital is costly. A decentralised supervisor takes account of this reduction when he maximises 
his welfare function. Yet, since the decentralised home supervisor does not take account of foreign shareholders’ 
welfare reduction, he may set higher capital requirements than the level that would be socially optimal when the 
foreign shareholders’ welfare is taken into account.
In reality, to the extent that Basel 2 imposes a certain amount of leveling of capital requirements across countries, 
one might wonder whether authorities could in practice engage in the “races” studied in the above papers. 
Actually, the ideas of these models could still apply in the frame of Pillar 2 of the Basel Accord, since Pillar 2 allows 
authorities to exercise a certain degree of discretion in imposing capital requirements in response to the assessment 
of certain risks not explicitly taken into account in the capital formulas of Pillar I.
(2) Withholding of information by authorities
Because information plays a crucial role in crisis management, domestic authorities may withhold information 
in the case of crisis in order to protect their own domestic interests. Information-sharing mechanisms between 
domestic authorities in normal times, however, may be argued to reduce asymmetries of information in a crisis 
involving a cross-border bank. Ex-ante information sharing, however, will only occur if authorities expect a low 
level of conﬂicts of interest in crisis times, or if authorities in other countries are believed to be unlikely to exploit 
their information opportunistically in the case of crisis. In other words, the beneﬁts of sharing information today 
must exceed the potential costs for domestic authorities resulting from dealing with better informed counterparts 
in foreign countries in crisis times. The level of information sharing is thus endogenously determined. For instance, 
Holthausen and Rønde (2003) study the information sharing incentives just preceding bank closure. They conclude 
that even if the appropriate formal channels for the exchange of information are in place, the current regulatory 
framework might not work well if the interests of the supervisors in different countries are very different. National 
supervisors are assumed to maximize the welfare of their own country, disregarding welfare of other countries. 
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Supervisors in different countries will not always agree on whether to close an ailing bank because, generally, the 
two countries will be affected differently by the closure decision. The national supervisors thus have asymmetric 
interests resulting from differences in their own exposures, in the exposure of domestic stakeholders, in the 
importance of the bank in each country, in the impact on their deposit insurance scheme, etc. Consequently,   
as  incentives  to  share  information  are  not  perfectly  aligned  at  the  point  of  closure  of  a  bank,  none  of  the 
supervisory authorities will beneﬁt from perfect information sharing.
(3) Excessive forbearance in closure policy
Acharya (2003) studies another form of race to the bottom by supervisory authorities, i.e. a race to forbearance 
in the decision to close, to liquidate or to withdraw the banking license of a bank. In this model, a greater 
forbearance in one country constitutes a competitive edge for the banks located in that country. In particular, 
banks located in that country will be able to invest in more risky assets. Acharya (2003) observes that if capital 
requirements are constrained to be the same across countries, then supervisory authorities may engage in a race 
to forbearance, because of the competitive edge that is obtained.
Calzolari and Loranth (2004) study a model in which a supervisor faces a trade-off between intervening early 
and closing a bank   which generates a sure cost but which may prove to be unnecessary if the bank could 
have survived   and waiting, which may generate a substantially higher cost if the bank is insolvent and if its 
insolvency worsens over time. Differences in banks’ organisational structures (branches versus subsidiaries) lead 
to differences in the likelihood of intervention by foreign and domestic regulators. These differences of regulators 
in the tendency to intervene in troubled banks derive from the differences in the foreign and home regulators’ 
deposit insurance liabilities according to whether the bank is organised via subsidiaries or branches. In addition, 
the availability of assets from the parent unit to bail out the foreign unit will depend upon whether that unit is 
a branch or a subsidiary. When the bank is organised via subsidiaries, the home regulator will have the tendency 
to intervene earlier in the home unit than the foreign regulator in the foreign unit because the home regulator 
beneﬁts from the residual proﬁts of the foreign subsidiary but is protected from losses of the subsidiary. The home 
regulator will intervene less often when the bank is organised via branches because the supervisor has to repay 
foreign depositors.
(4) Inefﬁciency of improvised co-operation when public funds are needed
In the model of Freixas (2003), a bank bailout is considered to be a public good, and improvised co-operation will 
lead to an inefﬁcient level of bail out. When co-operation is improvised, different countries’ authorities must meet 
to ﬁnd out how much they are willing to contribute to a bail out. If the amount they are willing to contribute is 
greater than the costs of assistance, the bank is bailed out. This game may in fact have a multiplicity of equilibria. 
In one of them, the bank is never bailed out if the beneﬁts of the bailout in at least one country do not exceed the 
total costs in the home and host countries ; i.e., if no individual country is ready to ﬁnance the bail out by itself. This 
is obviously inefﬁcient ; improvised cooperation will lead to under-provision of the public good. Co-ordination is 
also possible. A single, centralised authority may be designated to collect the beneﬁts and costs estimates of each 
individual country. Each country will have the incentive to reveal its beneﬁts and costs truthfully if the information 
that is obtained is only used to reach a bailout decision but cannot be used in the cost sharing rule. Some incentive-
compatible mechanisms can be implemented (e.g., the Groves-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet incentive compatible 
mechanism), in which there is no room for ex-post negotiation or for information manipulation.162
2.4  Conﬂicting national legal frameworks
Even  in  the  absence  of  conﬂicts  of  interest  between 
national authorities, the resolution of a cross-border crisis 
will  be  more  complex  than  the  resolution  of  a  purely 
domestic  crisis  because  national  legal  frameworks  may 
differ or, worse, may even be contradictory. In this section, 
we present a few illustrations of potential obstacles result-
ing from conﬂicting legal frameworks.
Competition laws in a country may constitute an obstacle 
to the resolution of a cross-border crisis. In some cases the 
proposed resolution mechanism  –  for instance a takeover 
of the ailing bank by a sound bank  –  may be forbidden 
by a country’s legislation, because the proposed solution 
would result in an unacceptable level of concentration in 
the banking sector. Although arrangements may be found 
between  national  authorities  to  overcome  this  prob-
lem  –  such as, for instance, a partial takeover or the sale 
of the entity in the concentrated country to another partic-
ipant  –  these problems are likely to take time to resolve.
Another legal area which may impede a swift resolution 
process is that of differing insolvency arrangements across 
countries. (See Box 3 for an illustration of the BCCI case, 
which spanned countries outside of the European Union). 
In  order  to  overcome  these  problems  within  the  EU, 
several issues concerning insolvency arrangements have 
been  addressed  by  the  European  Winding-up  directive 
(see e.g. Deguée, 2001). This directive states that, in the 
EU, the insolvency framework of the home country will be 
used for cross-border banks organised via branches. The 
home authority is thus given the exclusive right to initiate 
the  reorganisation  measures  and  winding-up  proceed-
ings, using its national legislation on the winding up of 
ﬁnancial institutions. Although the Winding-up directive 
facilitates the legal treatment of cross-border insolvencies, 
it clearly does not solve the potential conﬂicts of interest 
between national authorities mentioned in Section 2.3.
Many questions remain with regard to the allocation of 
powers between national authorities when dealing with 
the insolvency of a cross-border banking group organised 
via subsidiaries. For instance, in a situation in which the 
parent company of an ailing foreign subsidiary decides to 
liquidate it, could the authorities in the country hosting 
the subsidiary force the parent company to recapitalize it 
instead ? Could the home authorities oppose a recapitali-
zation that would weaken the parent structure ? Similarly, 
if the parent company is in trouble but the subsidiary is 
sound, could the parent company proceed to a “ﬁre sale” 
of the sound systemic subsidiary ? Could the authorities in 
the country hosting the subsidiary oppose such a liquida-
tion, even in the absence of buyers at a fair price ?
Two  issues  actually  underlie  these  questions :  (1)  the 
“source  of  strength”  doctrine  and  the  associated  rela-
tionships between parent company and subsidiaries ; and 
(2)  the  feasibility  of  transferring  assets  within  a  group 
organized via subsidiaries. The source of strength doctrine 
requires that a bank holding company uses the resources 
in its banking and non-banking subsidiaries to support 
a distressed subsidiary bank (see e.g. Ashcraft, 2004). In   
the  U.S.,  the  Federal  Reserve  applies  the  source  of 
strength doctrine by assuming that it is an unsafe and 
unsound banking practice for a parent holding company 
to fail to act as a source of strength to a troubled bank-
ing  subsidiary  when  resources  are  available  within  the 
parent company. In addition, the U.S. Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989  gives the 
FDIC the authority to charge off any expected losses from 
a failing banking subsidiary to the capital of the non-fail-
ing afﬁliate banks within the group. Yet, the application 
of this doctrine, even in the US, has proven to be prob-
lematic. For instance, in two cases (the MCorp and the 
BNEC cases), the Federal Reserve faced legal opposition 
to  the  application  of  the  source  of  strength  doctrine. 
Although one case made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the substantive issue was never resolved, and both cases 
were ﬁnally settled out of court (see e.g. Bliss, 2005). In 
summary, the application of this principle by an authority 
in a cross-border setting is likely to generate both conﬂicts 
of  interest  between  national  authorities  and  long  legal 
disputes.
A necessary condition for applying the source of strength 
doctrine is that assets be easily transferable between all 
units of a group, including the parent and all the sub-
sidiaries. However, as subsidiaries are legally incorporated 
entities  and  as  the  subsidiaries  in  a  given  group  have 
differing  stakeholders  and  creditors,  the  management 
of each subsidiary is generally required by law to protect 
the  interests  of  the  particular  company  they  manage. 
Consequently, transfers within a group are typically sub-
ject to the arm’s-length principle, and detrimental trans-
fers may eventually be ruled (perhaps retroactively) to be 
null and void. In addition, company law often prevents 
the group-wide interest from prevailing negatively on the 
individual  company  interest.  Thus,  ﬁnancial  authorities, 
because of their national mandates, may have the duty to 
prevent any detrimental transfers from entities under their 
supervision, and they might be held liable if they do not, 
even if the “detrimental” transfer has been orchestrated 
in  co-operation  with  foreign  authorities.  Consequently, 
whereas the principle of group solidarity is often taken 
for granted, this principle may not actually be applied in 
practice if the banking group faces severe problems.163
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Box 3  –  Conﬂicting insolvency arrangements : a mortality review of BCCI
This box illustrates how cross-country differences in insolvency arrangements could inﬂuence the management 
of a crisis of a cross-border bank  (1) (see e.g. Contact Group on the Legal and Institutional Underpinnings of the 
International  Financial  System,  2002).  Countries  may  differ  on  several  fundamental  points.  These  conﬂicting 
principles create uncertainty regarding the ﬁnal outcome of a crisis resolution process.
A ﬁrst crucial difference is linked to the speciﬁcity of the ﬁnancial sector. Some countries have designed insolvency 
arrangements that are speciﬁc to banks and that thus take account of bank speciﬁcity. However, in other countries, 
the legislative framework on insolvency is common to all ﬁrms. In addition, each legislative framework is based on 
one of two conﬂicting principles :
–    the principle of unity of bankruptcy : in which one competent court  –  namely the court of the country in which 
the bank is headquartered  –  decides on the bankruptcy of the debtor ;
–    the principle of plurality of territory : in which the bankruptcy proceeding is effective only in the country in which 
it is initiated.
Other fundamental principles settling insolvency arrangements in national legislation can be conﬂicting :
–    the single entity principle : in which all assets of the bank are encompassed in the liquidation (worldwide 
creditors) ;
–    the separate entity principle : in which each entity is considered as a separate bank.
Besides these broad principles, speciﬁc legal clauses may be conﬂicting. For instance, the right to set-off claims in 
two different jurisdictions is likely to be different. Depending on the jurisdiction, set-off may be forbidden, partially 
allowed or totally allowed. If it is partially allowed, some conditions may be required for bilateral set-off to be 
authorised. Conditions may include that claims are denominated in the same currency, are booked in the same 
legal entity, in the same country or have the same maturity.
A mortality review of BCCI illustrates the uncertainty that results from the lack of coordination when regulators 
confront different insolvency laws (see e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1992 and Herring 2003). 
BCCI banking activities were composed of a bank incorporated in the Cayman Islands (BCCI Overseas) and a 
bank incorporated in Luxembourg (BCCI SA). The non-bank holding company heading these two banks was 
incorporated in Luxembourg. Although BCCI SA was supervised in Luxembourg, its activities were conducted in 
15 countries through 47 different branches and 2 subsidiaries. BCCI Overseas operated in 28 countries through 
63 branches. The operational headquarters of BCCI Overseas were located in the United Kingdom. The other 
subsidiaries and afﬁliates of BCCI Holdings operated 255  banking ofﬁces in about 30 countries. Subsequent to the 
fraud in 1991, authorities in the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, the UK and the US secured control of the assets of 
BCCI. Yet, conﬂicts in national insolvency arrangements made the liquidation of BCCI exceedingly complex.
First, the US did not apply general bankruptcy laws to banks. In addition, foreign bank insolvencies were ruled by 
their own legal framework, which was different from both the framework for ﬁrm bankruptcy and for domestic 
bank insolvency (see e.g. Schwarcz, 2005). On the other hand, the same liquidation law was applied to banks as 
to other ﬁrms in the UK. A third regime was applied in Luxembourg, in which a court had to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to apply general bankruptcy laws or speciﬁc rules.
(1)  Note that the UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvency of 1997 excludes banks from its scope. The problem of conﬂicting laws may thus be even more acute 
for banks than for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
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2.5  Complexity and size of banking group
Even  if  national  authorities’  interests  were  perfectly 
aligned  and  legal  frameworks  compatible,  the  opera-
tional structure of banks might create difﬁculties in the 
management of a crisis. Indeed, because the operational 
structure of a bank could potentially distort the capacity 
of  authorities  to  effectively  exert  their  powers,  it  may 
introduce  a  divergence  between  the  formal  power  of 
authorities and their real power. The choice of operational 
structure is thus not neutral from a crisis management 
point of view. In particular two types of structures may 
cause distortions.
First,  some  banking  groups  organize  their  operations 
along business lines (e.g. retail banking, asset manage-
ment, merchant banking, etc.), which may cross national 
borders. Such organisation may result in a transfer of deci-
sion power from the national entities of the group to a 
centralised business-line manager, who will not necessar-
ily be in the home country. Consequently, it may be more 
difﬁcult  for  nationally-mandated  (i.e.,  “decentralised”) 
authorities to manage a crisis, as the cross-border integra-
tion of business line management may increase the risk of 
intra-group, cross-border contagion.
Not only did the bankruptcy laws applied to the bank differed across countries, but also did the fundamental 
principles underlying these different codes. While the US applied a separate entity principle to the liquidation 
of US branches of foreign banks  (1), Luxembourg and the UK insolvency arrangements relied on a single entity 
principle. Consequently, in the US, a preference was given to domestic claims as the creditors of the US branch 
were repaid from the assets of the US branch in the United States or worldwide. Creditors from other ofﬁces of 
the bank, on the other hand, had access to the remaining assets only when creditors of the domestic branch 
had been indemniﬁed. Luxembourg and the UK insolvency arrangements considered, in contrast, that the bank 
and all its foreign branches belonged to a single entity. Therefore, no geographical class of creditors were given 
preference.
As this brief overview shows, a lack of convergence of insolvency agreements may lead to unequal and conﬂicting 
treatment of similar creditors. This opens the door to long legal procedures, which are justiﬁed by the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the insolvency arrangements.
(1)  A US chartered bank is liquidated using the single entity principle.
TABLE  3  FITCH SUPPORT RATING: LARGE COUNTRIES VERSUS SMALL COUNTRIES
Rating Number of banks Percentage
Large countries Small countries Large countries Small countries
1. Extremely high probability of external support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 44 52.1 68.8
2. High probability of external support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10 13.7 15.6
3. Moderate probability of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5 27.4 7.8
4. Limited probability of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2.1 3.1
5. External support, although possible, cannot be relied upon . . 7 3 4.8 4.7
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 64 100.0 100.0
Source: Bankscope – April 2006 + own calculation.165
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Secondly, some banking groups have begun centralising 
key operational or risk management functions. When a 
banking group centralises operational functions, such as 
back ofﬁce operations, there is a risk that the authorities 
hosting a subsidiary of the group will become unable to 
supervise these functions. In addition, they may be unable 
to assist a sound subsidiary if the parent company that 
houses the key operational functions goes bankrupt. As a 
response to such a contingency, authorities are putting in 
place a policy to manage the outsourcing risk arising from 
the centralisation of key activities in parent companies  (1).
The  centralisation  of  key  risk  management  functions, 
such as liquidity risk management, in a banking group 
raises  additional  challenges.  First,  it  may  question  the 
effectiveness of host country supervision of liquidity risk 
in  branches  and  subsidiaries.  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
authorities hosting foreign branches and subsidiaries are 
legally responsible for the liquidity of these institutions, 
they  may  not  be  able  to  control  how  the  liquidity  is 
managed in the parent company. In addition, centralised 
liquidity management may weaken the legal protections 
arising  from  the  subsidiary  structure,  as  it  may  create 
features that make the group resemble one with a branch 
structure.
Regarding the problems linked to institution size discussed 
in Section 1, an additional potential issue that arises in 
a  cross-border  setting  may  make  the  development  of 
cross-border arrangements for crisis management more 
complex.  Namely,  large  cross-border  banks  established 
in small countries may potentially suffer from a handicap 
that is sometimes referred to as “too-big-to-save”. The 
comparison across small and large countries in Table 1, of 
the share of GDP accounted for by the assets of banks, 
suggests that small countries’ authorities who would like 
to ﬁnancially support some of their large banks in some 
extreme tail event might be in a challenging situation  (2). 
This  putative  handicap,  however,  depends  upon  the 
extent to which markets price moral hazard associated 
with the ambiguity surrounding potential support in large 
and small countries. Yet, rating agencies (and markets) do 
not seem to consider the issue of the size of large banks 
in  small  countries  as  particularly  relevant.  For  example, 
the Fitch Support Rating represents a judgement by Fitch 
of a potential supporter’s propensity to provide support 
(1)  In Belgium, the CBFA issued a Circular (Circular PPB 2004 / 5) on sound practices 
with regards to the outsourcing by ﬁnancial institutions in 2004. See also e.g. 
Kaufman (2004) or Reserve Bank of New-Zealand (2004) for the speciﬁcities of 
the policy on outsourcing in New-Zealand.
(2)  This is a very complex issue. Indeed, even if the banking sector of a country is 
exclusively composed of small banks, the country may encounter difﬁculties if 
these banks are strongly interrelated, causing a high degree of contagion.  
In addition, a mere look at assets is not sufﬁcient as it does not give an indication 
of the potential size of risks.
(3)  Admittedly, the support rating is not a perfect measure, as the potential 
supporter is not necessarily a sovereign state. Also, we have not controlled for 
other variables which might differentiate the banking sectors in small and large 
countries.
to an ailing bank and of its ability to provide the support. 
The potential supporter can be a sovereign state or an 
institutional owner. A quick examination of Fitch Support 
Ratings, shown in Table 3, suggests that the probability of 
a bank receiving external support in small European coun-
tries is not fundamentally different from the probability 
of receiving external support in large European countries. 
These data thus appear to be more consistent with the 
view that large banks in small countries are more likely 
to be too-big-to-fail than too-big-to-save  (3). Rime (2005) 
presents similar results. He bases his analysis on issuer rat-
ings (Moody’s and Fitch) and concludes that rating agen-
cies  do  incorporate  the  too-big-to-fail  doctrine  in  their 
ratings but do not consider the potential too-big-to-save 
issue. Nevertheless, the fact that rating agencies currently 
do not seem to take account of potential too-big-to-save 
effects  does  not  close  the  debate  on  large  banks  and 
country size. Indeed, in a crisis involving a large cross-
border  bank,  tensions  may  surface  between  countries 
with asymmetric ﬁnancial capacities. This constitutes an 
additional issue that renders cross-border crisis manage-
ment complex.
Countries  with  large  banks  have  a  vested  interest  in 
limiting the moral hazard associated with the ambiguity 
surrounding  the  potential  public  support.  Interestingly, 
Fitch support ratings appear, at least at ﬁrst sight, to be 
determined both by geographical features and by banks’ 
activities. For instance, Fitch judges that large investment 
banking groups, which do not collect retail deposits, are 
unlikely to enjoy external support (see Table 4). Most of 
these large investment banks indeed receive a rating of 5, 
although some of them get a 4. Fitch, on the other hand, 
assumes that the (foreign) investment banking afﬁliates 
of large groups can rely on the support of their parent 
company, and these afﬁliates are indeed rated with a 1 
(e.g. Lehman Brothers Inc or Citibank International Plc). 
Commercial  banks  in  continental  Europe,  on  the  other 
hand, all receive very high support ratings. In the US and 
in the UK, however, commercial banks receive low support 
ratings, except if they can rely on their parent’s support. 
The ratings in Table 4 provide support for the idea that 
although public funds may be used to indemnify retail 
depositors, public funds are less likely to be used to assist 
ailing banks which are not funded by retail deposits.
Note that the issuance of support ratings by rating agen-
cies reﬂects the idea that market players take account of 
potential support by authorities. Rating agencies are in 
the process of reﬁning their methodologies to assess the 
probability of support. Moody’s, for instance, is review-
ing  its  methodology  for  banks  rating  and  published  in 
October 2005 a request for comments on a proposal to 
incorporate joint-default analysis into their banks’ ratings, 166
to reﬂect any form of support  (1), including national gov-
ernment support. Rating agencies thus provide informa-
tion relevant for the pricing of moral hazard  (2).
2.6  Uncertainty in the cross-border context
Similarly to domestic crises, cross-border crises are char-
acterised  by  uncertainty  and  must  be  managed  rapidly 
to  avoid  spillover  effects.  Yet,  additional  sources  of 
uncertainty  arise  in  a  cross-border  environment,  since 
players are likely to be imperfectly informed about crisis 
management procedures in other countries and about the 
situation of the ailing bank afﬁliates in those countries. 
Decisions may be taken less quickly because of the greater 
challenges relating to coordination of national authorities, 
communication to the ailing bank, and communication 
to the markets. In addition, coordination will be rendered 
more difﬁcult to the extent that crisis management pro-
cedures and cost sharing have not been deﬁned ex-ante 
and also to the extent that interests between authorities 
diverge.
The additional layers of complexity arising in the context of 
cross-border crises and highlighted in this section give rise 
to three challenges for cross-border crisis management :
 
(1)    to harmonise conﬂicting laws ;
 
(2)    to  reinforce  supervisory  co-ordination,  especially 
as  supervisory  co-ordination  helps  also  to  reinforce   
co-ordination in crisis times ;
 
(3)    to identify potential conﬂicts of interest resulting from 
national mandates and to design resolution mecha-
nisms that mitigate these conﬂicts of interest. This also 
implies reconciling the legal and operational structures 
of banks with the effective supervisory responsibilities 
of home and host authorities.
The  next  section  identiﬁes  past  and  current  initiatives 
aimed at meeting these objectives.
(1)  The joint-default analysis would be based on a sequential support model,  
which would assess the parent and the government probability of support  
(see Moody’s, 2005).
(2)  O’hara and Shaw (1990) study the consequences on bank equity of the testimony 
before Congress of the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984. In that statement, 
the Comptroller of the Currency acknowledged that the 11 largest banks in  
the US were too-big-to-fail. They ﬁnd that positive returns for the concerned 
banks followed that statement. On the other hand, they ﬁnd negative wealth 
effect for the remaining banks. The magnitude of these effects depend upon 
bank solvency and size. Morgan and Stiroh (2005) investigate the bond spreads-
ratings relationship. They ﬁnd a ﬂatter relationship for too-big-to-fail banks, 
suggesting that investors take account of potential support in bond spreads.
TABLE  4  FITCH SUPPORT RATING:






Macquarie Bank Ltd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AU 4
Nomura Securities Co, Ltd . . . . . . . . JP 4
Bank Morgan Stanley AG . . . . . . . . . CH 1
Citibank International Plc . . . . . . . . . GB 1
Standard Bank Plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 2
Bear Stearns Companies Inc . . . . . . . US 5
Charles Schwab Corporation . . . . . . US 5
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc . . . . . . US 1
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc . . . . . . . . US 5
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc . . . . . US 5
Lehman Brothers Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . US 1
Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc . . . . . . . . . . . US 5
Morgan Stanley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US 5
Commercial banks
and savings banks
Dexia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BE 1
Fortis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BE 1
KBC Bank NV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BE 2
Banque AGF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FR 1
BNP Paribas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FR 1
Dexia Crédit Local SA . . . . . . . . . . . . FR 1
Société Générale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FR 1
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG DE 1
Commerzbank AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DE 1
Deutsche Bank AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DE 1
Dresdner Bank AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DE 1
Capitalia SpA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IT 2
Dexia Banque Internationale à Lux. SA LU 1
Fortis Banque Luxembourg SA . . . . . LU 1
ABN Amro Holding NV . . . . . . . . . . . NL 1
Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) NV . . NL 1
ING Bank NV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NL 1
Nordea Bank AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SE 1
Bank of Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 1
Barclays Bank Plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 1
HBOS Plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 5
HSBC Bank Plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 1
HSBC Holdings Plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 5
UBS Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GB 1
Bank of America Corporation . . . . . US 5
Citigroup Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US 5
HSBC Finance Corporation . . . . . . . . US 1
HSBC USA Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US 1
JP Morgan Chase & Co . . . . . . . . . . . US 5
JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA . . . . . . . US 1
Source: Bankscope – April 2006.
Note: The following codes for countries are used:
AU: Australia; BE: Belgium; CH: Switzerland; DE: Germany; FR: France;
GB: United Kingdom; IT: Italy; JP: Japan; LU: Luxembourg; NL: Netherlands;
SE: Sweden; US: United States.167
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3.    Past and current initiatives in 
cross-border supervision and crisis 
management.
Sections  1  and  2  have  identiﬁed  crucial  issues  relating 
to the management of domestic and cross-border crises, 
leading  to  three  challenges  for  improving  cross-border 
crisis  management.  Improvements  resulting  from  these 
challenges,  however,  are  not  likely  to  be  exclusively 
focused on crisis management but may concern banking 
supervision as well, since supervisory arrangements have 
a  direct  impact  on  crisis  management  and  vice-versa. 
Efforts to date have indeed concentrated almost solely on 
supervision of cross-border institutions, and few explicit 
provisions for managing crises of cross-border banks have 
been put in place. Further improvements could come from 
the formulation of explicit crisis resolution arrangements. 
This  section  brieﬂy  reviews  several  initiatives  that  have 
contributed to improving cross-border crisis management 
and potential directions for future initiatives.
3.1  Harmonizing conﬂicting laws
A  number  of  European  directives  have  recently  been 
issued which help to reduce conﬂicts in the EU legisla-
tive framework relating to banking supervision and crisis 
management.  Many  of  these  directives  have  resulted 
from  the  Financial  Services  Action  Plan  (FSAP).  They 
include the Winding up directive, the Directive on deposit 
guarantee schemes, the Directive on ﬁnancial collateral 
and the Financial conglomerates directive. The European 
Commission, however, has recently noted that the trans-
position  of  Community  law  resulting  from  the  FSAP  is 
currently too slow.
3.2    Reinforcing supervisory coordination and 
fostering convergence of supervisory practices
The existing supervisory framework in the EU, established 
through the European banking Directives and in accord-
ance  with  the  Basel  Concordat  of  1975,  rests  on  the 
principles of home country control, of mutual recognition 
and  of  a  single  banking  licence.  This  framework,  from 
which  crisis  management  responsibilities  are  derived, 
could not work without some supervisory co-operation. 
Indeed, reinforcing supervisory co-operation and fostering 
convergence in supervisory practices have constituted the 
cornerstones of past and recent initiatives.
Initiatives to foster supervisory co-operation and co-ordi-
nate practices have been taken at the global level, mainly 
through  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision 
(BCBS). In 1990 the BCBS issued recommendations with 
regard to the exchange of information between super-
visors,  deﬁning  the  information  needs  of  the  parent 
authorities, as well as the information needs of the host 
authorities. More recently, the Concordat has been sup-
plemented with recommendations on minimum standards 
for the supervision of international banking groups and 
their  cross-border  establishments  (1992),  recommenda-
tions  on  the  supervision  of  cross-border  banks  (1996) 
and a consultative document on a revised version of the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2006). 
In parallel, the BCBS has also published high-level prin-
ciples  for  the  cross-border  implementation  of  the  New 
Accord (2003), principles for the home-host recognition 
of the advanced measurement approach for operational 
risk capital (2004) and a consultative document on home 
and host information sharing for effective Basel II Accord 
implementation (2005).
At the European level, an important role is being played by 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), 
whose mandate is to “advise the European Commission 
on  banking  policy  issues  and  promote  convergence  of 
supervisory practise across European Union [and] (…) also 
foster and review common implementation and consist-
ent application of Community legislation”  (1). The range of 
CEBS initiatives to improve co-operation and convergence 
of practices includes the following :
–    In order to improve co-operation, CEBS has recently 
published guidelines on cooperation between supervi-
sors of EU banking groups and investment ﬁrms (CEBS, 
2006).  These  guidelines  are  devised  to  promote  an 
efﬁcient supervisory framework for groups that operate 
in  several  EU  jurisdictions,  by  enhancing  the  opera-
tional networking of national supervisors. In addition, 
according to its Charter  (2), CEBS is also in the process of 
improving procedures for information exchanges.
–    In  order  to  enhance  convergence  of  supervisory 
practices,  CEBS  has  published  a  document  on  the 
application  of  the  supervisory  review  process  under 
Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord. CEBS has also published 
guidelines setting out a framework to deal with cross-
border applications for approval to use the Advanced 
Measurement Approach and the Internal Rating Based 
Approach.
(1)  See CEBS website : www.c-ebs.org
(2)  CEBS charter mentions that “considering that close co-operation as well as 
information exchange between regulatory authorities are essential for the 
successful supervision of the European banking sector and that synergies between 
banking supervision and central bank oversight should be taken into account, 
(…) The Committee will develop effective operational network mechanisms to 
facilitate the exchange of information in normal times and at times of stress 
and to enhance day-to-day consistent supervision and enforcement in the Single 
banking Market”.168
CEBS  has  also  acted  as  a  catalyst  in  a  series  of  other 
projects. For instance, CEBS has recently published guide-
lines on a common reporting framework to be used by 
credit institutions and investment ﬁrms in reporting their 
solvency ratios to supervisory authorities under the Capital 
requirements directive (CRD), as well as guidelines for the 
implementation of the framework for consolidated ﬁnan-
cial  reporting.  Harmonisation  of  reporting  also  remains 
one of the objectives of the Commission of the European 
Communities  (2005),  which  expressed  its  intention  to 
develop  common  reporting  requirements  and  poten-
tially  common  prudential  databases  by  2009.  Indeed,   
from  2009,  all  EU  banks,  insurance  undertakings  and 
major investment companies should be able to send one 
complete reporting package to the competent authority 
at the consolidated level.
Other  bilateral  and  multilateral  initiatives  have  recently 
contributed to improving supervisory networks. Authorities 
in several countries have negotiated bilateral and multilat-
eral Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). The allocation 
of  supervisory  responsibilities  is  sometimes  deﬁned  in 
MoU, which may include practical considerations regard-
ing the exchange of information, joint inspections, organi-
zation  of  contacts  between  supervisors,  etc.  (see  e.g. 
Majaha-Jartby and Olafsson, 2005). MoU may be drafted 
with respect to a speciﬁc cross-border (cross-sector) group 
or may be more general, describing expected behaviour 
of  authorities  in  speciﬁc  situations.  In  accordance  with 
their  competencies,  authorities  such  as  central  banks 
or treasuries, in addition to supervisory authorities, may 
be parties to these MoU. However, MoU do not prevail 
over national laws and do not modify responsibilities of 
national authorities (see e.g. Wymeersch, 2005).
The reinforcement of supervisory coordination and conver-
gence of supervisory practices are essential for mitigating 
potential conﬂicts of interest between national authorities. 
These activities also help to create networks of authorities. 
Creation of such networks is a necessary  –  although not 
sufﬁcient  –  condition  for  diminishing  conﬂicts  of  inter-
est  in  the  management  of  cross-border  crises,  as  trust 
appears to be an essential element in the management of 
a crisis. The economic literature on “social capital” con-
ﬁrms this view and suggests indeed that social connec-
tions may help agents to interact co-operatively  (1). One 
of the objectives of networks of supervisors is to create 
this social capital. However, if a signiﬁcant crisis were to 
arise, conﬂicts of interest could potentially take the upper 
hand over trust. More robust mechanisms are probably 
needed for identifying conﬂicts of interest and solving or 
mitigating them.
3.3    Looking forward : Identiﬁcation of conﬂicts of 
interest and design of a robust crisis resolution 
mechanism
There would appear to exist some prerequisites for deﬁn-
ing  a  robust  mechanism  for  dealing  with  cross-border 
crises. The development of such a mechanism could be 
structured around three steps : (1) agreement on condi-
tions  for  potential  recourse  to  public  funds ;  (2)  clear 
deﬁnition  of  crisis  responsibilities  and  (3)  test  of  the 
proposed  framework.  In  addition,  a  clear  deﬁnition  of 
objectives, roles and responsibilities of agencies in charge 
of crisis management at the national level could facilitate 
the  development  of  procedures  for  cross-border  crisis 
management.
Agreement on conditions for potential recourse to 
public funds : As crisis management may require public 
funds, it would be desirable to agree ex-ante on the con-
ditions under which public funds would be used and how 
costs, if any, would be allocated. The design of such a 
mechanism would therefore need to answer at least two 
questions :
–    (a) In which cases could public funds (taxpayers’ money) 
be  used,  and  which  cases  must  be  solved  without 
public funds ?
–    (b) How to share costs in the cases where public funds 
are used ?
(a) The recourse to public funds to manage a crisis usually 
constitutes a last resort. In theory, public funds should be 
used to indemnify retail depositors only when the deposit 
insurance  scheme  is  publicly  funded.  In  other  cases, 
authorities should try to limit their role to the provision 
of  emergency  liquidity  assistance,  if  necessary,  and  to 
the role of a “powerful broker” in facilitating a market-
based solution to the crisis. These latter mechanisms also 
present the advantage of limiting moral hazard. As such 
mechanisms  are  by  nature  ad-hoc,  however,  the  range 
of measures that could be implemented and the nature 
of critical functions that should be protected should be 
further studied.
In practice, however, despite authorities’ ability to make 
use of these mechanisms, in some extreme situations the 
use of public funds may nevertheless be required to avoid 
very  large  disruptions  in  the  banking  sector.  Yet,  even 
in these situations, it remains essential to try to restrict 
the use of public funds to the indemniﬁcation of retail 
depositors. Different ways to do this should be explored. 
First, ensuring the continuity of critical functions is one 
avenue that could be pursued. Second, the Purchase and 
(1)  Glaeser et al. (2000) use experimental economics to show that trust may facilitate 
the co-operation necessary to achieve a public good.169
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Assumption (P&A) regime implemented in the US could 
be further studied, especially as this regime, in which a 
healthy ﬁnancial institution purchases (some of) the assets 
of an ailing bank (e.g. loans) and assumes (some of) its 
liabilities  (e.g.  insured  deposits  and  secured  liabilities), 
enables authorities to protect insured depositors  (1) with-
out  necessarily  extending  their  protection  to  uninsured 
depositors. Third, the restriction on the recourse to public 
funds suggests that some sort of ﬁrewalls could be put in 
place to prevent a shock arising from a complex ﬁnancial 
group’s  potentially  riskier  activities  from  affecting  the 
bank’s retail depositors. This principle would facilitate the 
design  of  cross-border  cost  sharing  agreements.  Some 
large  and  complex  ﬁnancial  institutions  have  adopted 
organisational  structures  that  potentially  limit  excessive 
contagion from wholesale activities to retail activities, for 
instance by locating some of their activities in subsidiaries 
rather than in a department of the same legal entity  (2). 
From a public good perspective, an advantage associated 
with this structure is that while such an organisational 
design does not prevent the mother company from sup-
porting a legally isolated business line in a stressful envi-
ronment, it would help to cap the public support in the 
extreme cases where public funds would be at risk. In a 
cross-border setting, an agreement to better deﬁne the 
limits of potential public support is an important condi-
tion, although not the only one, for a more integrated 
ﬁnancial supervisory architecture.
(b) The presence of different national pools of tax-payers 
suggests that it would be desirable to deﬁne ex-ante a 
mechanism to allocate costs in tempore non suspecto, in 
order to avoid tensions between national authorities in a 
crisis. The question of the burden sharing in case of crisis 
is addressed in Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006). Three 
important features of cost sharing schemes would need 
to be addressed :
1.  Should the mechanism be bank-speciﬁc or not ?
2.  Should the mechanism be preﬁnanced or not ?
3.  Which rule should be used to allocate costs ?
These choices are important, as they inﬂuence the incen-
tives for authorities to co-operate.
1.    In  a  bank-speciﬁc  mechanism,  only  the  countries  in 
which the bank requiring assistance is active (accord-
ing to the allocation rule) would provide ﬁnance. If the 
mechanism is not bank speciﬁc, all the countries par-
ticipating in the cost sharing mechanism are “jointly 
liable” in case of a crisis. The choice of this feature 
would not only affect the crisis management setting 
but  would  likely  have  an  important  bearing  on  the 
supervisory architecture.
2.    With preﬁnancing, participants allocate premiums to a 
fund that could be tapped on short notice by an author-
ity which, ideally, would internalize all the domestic 
and cross-border knock-on effects resulting from the 
crisis. The funds could also be supplied only if a crisis 
arises,  according  to  a  predetermined  sharing  rule.
       Both  preﬁnancing  and  ex-ante  cost  sharing  mecha-
nisms  may  be  problematic.  First,  as  the  amount  of 
funds that would be necessary to manage a crisis is 
uncertain, preﬁnancing may be difﬁcult because the 
fund  could  be  quickly  exhausted  in  a  severe  crisis. 
Should the fund be depleted, participants who were 
not affected by the crisis might be reluctant to reﬁ-
nance the fund. In addition, setting up such a fund 
might create moral hazard problems for banks and for 
authorities in charge of supervision.
       Ex-ante cost sharing agreements, on the other hand, 
are  also  complex  to  implement.  The  crisis  “game” 
is  played  only  once  or  very  infrequently,  so  there 
may  only  be  limited  possibilities  to  punish  devia-
tions  (though  repeated  interactions  in  the  course 
of  supervision  in  normal  times  and  throughout  the 
evolution of the crisis might introduce some ways to 
punish  deviations).  In  addition,  contracts  are  neces-
sarily  incomplete,  as  they  can  not  take  account  of 
all  possible  contingencies.  Cost-sharing  mechanisms 
might also reveal themselves to be inconsistent with 
Community rules preventing state aid to ailing ﬁrms. 
Goodhart  (2005)  argues  that  at  the  national  level, 
authorities  in  charge  of  crisis  management  could 
decide to solve the emergency situation ﬁrst and to 
check consistency with EU directives at a later stage. 
This would seem to be more problematic to accom-
plish  with  funds  managed  directly  at  the  EU  level.
(1)  On the P&A regime, see e.g. chapter 3 of FDIC (1998). The range of possible 
P&A resolution structures implemented by the FDIC varies from the basic P&A to 
more complex structures requiring a bridge bank or a loss sharing P&A. In a basic 
P&A transaction, cash and cash equivalents are passed to the acquirer, together 
with some of the insured deposits. Besides cash, loans may also be passed to 
the acquirer (such as in loan purchase P&As or in modiﬁed P&As). Put options 
on certain assets that are transferred may be offered by the FDIC to the acquirer 
in order to induce the acquirer to accept a larger share of the assets. In order 
to decrease the amount of assets it holds, the FDIC may also organise, in some 
cases, a bid that concerns all the assets of the ailing bank (whole bank P&As). 
Instead of selling assets at a discounted price, in loss sharing P&As, the FDIC 
accepts to assume some of the future losses of the transferred pool of assets. In 
a bridge bank structure, the acquirer is the FDIC (see box 1 for more information 
on bridge bank structures). See also Covitz et al. (2004) for the impact of the 
introduction of the P&A regime on subordinated debt issuance decisions in the 
US and on its implications for market discipline.
(2)  Such structures were implemented for reasons which are not directly linked 
to ﬁnancial stability. For instance, the asset management business line is often 
incorporated in a subsidiary. This may be less the case for investment banking.170
3.    The choice of a rule to allocate the costs of a crisis is 
conceptually and practically difﬁcult but is nevertheless 
critical, as it will inﬂuence the incentives and behaviour 
of both banks and authorities. An additional question 
regarding such a rule, however, is whether it should be 
based on (risk-weighted) assets, liabilities, or on some 
other criterion.
Deﬁnition  of  crisis  management  responsibilities : 
The preceding analysis suggests that the current frame-
work  for  crisis  management  could  be  improved.  Any 
new framework, however, would need to be compatible 
with the funding mechanism and should provide a clear 
allocation of responsibilities. As the design of the fund-
ing  mechanism  is  intrinsically  linked  to  the  allocation 
of responsibilities, the compatibility between these two 
components should be assured. In addition, compatibility 
of the funding mechanism and the allocation of respon-
sibilities with the supervisory architecture should be also 
checked, as they are fundamentally interrelated.
The current institutional design leaves too much room for 
unconstructive ambiguity and for tensions  (1). In order to 
reduce these, it might be necessary to consider automatic 
procedures  for  triggering  crisis  management,  such  as 
prompt corrective action rules. Allocation of responsibili-
ties also implies not only clearly deﬁning the legal respon-
sibilities of each authority but also ensuring the will of 
each authority to perform the assigned tasks in case of 
crisis and the capacity of these authorities to perform the 
assigned tasks. In addition, the allocation of responsibili-
ties should have an undisputable legal basis.
Test  of  the  proposed  crisis  resolution  mechanism : 
Some authors have argued that a small cross-border crisis 
(small  enough  to  avoid  any  serious  problem  but  large 
enough  to  highlight  potential  weaknesses  of  current 
arrangements)  could  be  desirable  (see  e.g.  Goodhart, 
2005).  Well-designed  stress-tests  however  also  allow 
identiﬁcation of weaknesses of proposed crisis manage-
ment  arrangements  before  they  come  into  force.  Such 
exercises have the added beneﬁt of reinforcing networks 
of  crisis  management  authorities,  which  may  reduce 
obstacles  to  communication  and  coordination  in  an 
actual  crisis.  Finally,  stress-tests  can  allow  identiﬁcation 
of  situations  in  which  conﬂicts  of  interest  are  likely  to 
materialize and indicate which components of national 
legal frameworks could be conﬂicting. Yet, the extent to 
which these stress-tests are really informative depends on 
the willingness of participants to act as if they were facing 
a real crisis. For example, participants may have ex-ante 
incentives to act cooperatively during exercises but less 
cooperatively in real crises.
This three-step approach is likely to deliver several differ-
ent  frameworks  for  crisis  management.  Some  of  these 
frameworks  may  require  institutional  or  legal  changes, 
especially as one may have reached the limits of what is 
legally possible to undertake in order to improve cross-
border crisis management in the current environment. The 
feasibility of each resulting framework may therefore be 
assessed as a function of the necessary changes it would 
imply. In addition, it is essential to understand that a neces-
sary condition for the system to work is that the allocation 
of responsibilities be compatible with the agreement on 
the conditions for potential recourse to public funds and 
vice-versa. Yet, although a cost allocation scheme should 
be  part  of  that  agreement,  it  would  seem  essential  to 
explore any avenue that would allow limiting the recourse 
to public funds, especially as public funds should only be 
used in a very restrictive number of cases. Pursuing such an 
avenue could help to reduce the different sources of moral 
hazard that are currently excessively present within the 
ﬁnancial system and thereby reinforce market discipline.
(1)  Note that “the need to clarify and optimise home-host responsibilities as 
integration accelerates” is one of the challenges identiﬁed by the Commission  
of the European Communities (2005).171
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